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Understanding university academic staff attitudes towards recognising and responding to student radicalisation

Research report

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Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Background

In response to acts of terrorism and a perceived rise in extremist attitudes, the UK government passed The Counter Terrorism and Security Act in July 2015 (including the so called Prevent Duty). The Act requires specified public sector authorities, including universities, to "pay due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" (Home Office, 2015, 26 (1)). This has meant that front-line staff, such as university lecturers, are expected to recognise and respond to signs of radicalisation. The legislation has proved controversial, with concerns about the securitisation of education, social services and health care, as well as fears of over-reporting which could stigmatise individuals or communities.

Despite the significance of the Act to the education sector and concerns about the implications of compelling educators to report radicalisation concerns, there is limited empirical research exploring the effects of the legislation and how education sector professionals have engaged with the policy. While we have some early anecdotal and qualitative insights into what academic staff at British universities think, there is no significant quantitative research that includes experimental methods to allow for causal inference. Furthermore, despite increasing concern about the threat from Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation, much existing research has focused on the implications of the implementation of the Prevent Duty on Muslim students, which limits our understanding of how educators recognise and respond to other types of radicalising influence. To address this gap, this report presents findings from a survey experiment, which examined academic's willingness and ability to recognise and respond to student radicalisation in British universities.

Specifically, this study addressed the following research questions:

1. How do academics teaching in British universities perceive the risk of radicalisation in universities and their role in identifying and responding to signs of possible radicalisation?

2. What factors shape the attitudes of academics teaching in British universities regarding their role in recognising and responding to cases of suspected student radicalisation?

3. What factors influence academics teaching in British universities' actions when faced with a case of suspected student radicalisation?

Key findings

- Our findings suggest that academics working in British universities are uncertain about the likelihood that students within their own or other universities are at risk of radicalisation. This likely reflects lack of confidence/knowledge linked to low levels of training and direct experience of dealing with students of concern. It may also reflect the fact that 'radicalisation' is a contested and ambiguous concept.

- Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation was considered the most likely radicalising influence in the context of British universities and 'mixed, unstable or unclear ideology' was considered the least likely. Given the relatively high prevalence of referrals with 'mixed, unstable or unclear ideology', further training may be required for academics working in British universities to recognise the current threat profile.

- Academics working in universities may hold more negative views towards reporting concern about student radicalisation in comparison with British school teachers. Ambivalence about reporting is driven by concerns about getting an innocent student into trouble and lack of confidence in recognising the appropriate threshold for reporting. It is also driven by free speech values.

- Free speech values are associated with negative attitudes towards the Prevent Duty and the reporting of radicalisation concern. It is crucial that these values are taken into consideration when implementing Prevent policies and in Prevent training if academics are to feel confident to raise concerns about potential radicalisation.

- More experienced academics are likely to hold more negative views about reporting radicalisation concern. This may be partially explained by the fact that Prevent training tends to be delivered to new staff. However, low levels of training uptake in our sample suggest this cannot be the sole explanation and further research is required to explain decreasing role commitment with increasing years of experience of university teaching.

- Prevent training is associated with increased commitment to reporting radicalisation concern and reduces concern about the potential negative impacts of reporting. However self-report ratings suggest that academics who have taken part in Prevent training have not found it to be particularly useful. Further research is required to establish why participants have not responded more positively to current training.

- Although our findings demonstrate concern among some academics working in British universities about the effectiveness of local authority and police responses

to reports of radicalisation, they also show that previous experience of dealing with a student of concern increases role commitment and reduces concerns about the potential negative impacts to the student of reporting. This suggests that those who have engaged with their university's safeguarding team were likely to have had a positive experience.

- There is no evidence to indicate a tendency for over-reporting among academics teaching in British universities, but there is some evidence to suggest that there may be reticence to report radicalisation concern even in situations where it could be considered appropriate to seek further advice. Academics are most likely to respond to a student of concern by informally discussing the case with colleagues. It is therefore important to ensure that training is not only offered to safeguarding teams, but also used to upskill the wider academic body to enhance the quality of peer advice.

Conclusions

This study employed a survey experiment to examine the willingness and ability of academics teaching in British universities to recognise and respond to student radicalisation. Overall, our findings suggest that academics are ambivalent towards their role in reporting radicalisation concern. These findings also suggest that academics are less confident than their counterparts in schools in recognising appropriate thresholds for reporting and are concerned about the potential negative consequences of referring a student of concern. Our study also demonstrates the importance of free speech values to academics, which underpin strong philosophical objections to the Prevent Duty among some members of the Higher Education community. Free speech values coupled with uncertainty and lack of confidence in the way that the authorities deal with students of concern underpin reporting ambivalence which may reduce the likelihood that academics would report a student of concern.

Uptake of Prevent training in our sample was low, and most who had undertaken any training indicated that they had not found it particularly useful. Despite this, Prevent training was positively associated with increased commitment to the role of reporting students of concern and also reduced concerns about the negative consequences of reporting, suggesting that it may play an important role in supporting universities to fulfil the Prevent Duty. Our findings suggest that Prevent training could be enhanced by targeting more experienced academics and by tackling concerns about the tensions between the Prevent Duty and freedom of speech policies and values. However, for this training to be effective it is essential that it is credible for an audience that is used to engaging with deep thinking on challenging issues.

Introduction

In response to acts of terrorism and a perceived rise in extremist attitudes, the UK government passed The Counter Terrorism and Security Act in July 2015 (including the so called Prevent Duty). The Act requires specified public sector authorities, including universities, to "pay due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism" (Home Office, 2015, p.26). Since its inception, 15–20-year-olds have consistently been the age category most likely to be referred (James, 2020) and 51% of all terrorism-related arrests in the UK over the past 20 years have been of people under the age of 30 (Allen & Harding, 2021). This has placed a burden on secondary schools, further education colleges and higher education institutions to comply with the Prevent Duty and has meant that front-line staff, such as university lecturers, are expected to recognise and respond to signs of radicalisation. The legislation has proved controversial, with concerns about the securitisation of education, social services and health care, as well as fears of over-reporting which could stigmatise individuals or communities (Lakhani & James, 2021; Parker, Lindekilde & Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2021).

The most recent publicly available data shows that 4,915 referrals were made to the Prevent programme during the year ending 31 March 2021. Following initial screening and assessment, 1,333 of these referrals were passed on to a multi-agency 'Channel panel' for further assessment and 688 were adopted as a Channel case and offered specialist support. Channel cases were most often referred due to concerns regarding Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation (46%), followed by concerns about individuals with mixed, unstable or unclear ideology (30%) and concerns about Islamist radicalisation (22%) (Home Office, 2021). Most Prevent referrals were made by the police (36%) and the second largest proportion (25%) came from the Education sector (Home Office, 2021). In all previous years, the Education sector made the most referrals. For example, the figures for the last full year prior to the pandemic show that 38% of referrals came from the Education sector (Home Office 2019). The Home Office attributed the drop in Education sector referrals in 2021/2 to "the closure of schools and universities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic" (Home Office, 2021). It is therefore expected that the Education sector will continue to be a primary source of Prevent referrals.

Despite the significance of the Act to the education sector and concerns about the implications of compelling educators to report radicalisation concerns, there is limited empirical research exploring the effects of the legislation and how education sector professionals have engaged with the policy. This is particularly so for Higher Education (HE), where publications to date have largely focused on policy critique (Durodie, 2016; O'Donnell, 2016). A notable exception is a recent piece of qualitative research with Prevent/Safeguarding leads and other staff at British HE institutions that was commissioned by the Department for Education (Higton et al. 2021). This research focused on how Prevent Duty processes are implemented in the HE sector and included

subsidiary questions about HE staff understanding of how and when to raise a Prevent related concern and barriers to reporting. However, fieldwork was delayed due to COVID-19 and limited to 25 interviews with Safeguarding/prevent leads and 5 other staff in British HE institutions. Consequently, the authors recognise that "the evidence base available for addressing these questions is limited" (p13, Higton et al. 2020).

While we have some early anecdotal and qualitative insights into what academic staff at British universities think, there is therefore no significant quantitative research that includes experimental methods to allow for causal inference. Research to date has focused primarily on schools (Bryan 2017; Busher et al. 2017; Busher, Choudhury & Thomas, 2019; Jerome, Elwick & Kazim, 2019; Parker, Chapot & Davis, 2019; Parker, Lindekilde & Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020; Parker, Lindekilde & Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2021) and further education colleges (James, 2020; Lakhani, 2020; Lakhani & James, 2021; Moffat & Gerard, 2019). Furthermore, despite increasing concern about the threat from Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation, much existing research has focused on the implications of the implementation of the Prevent Duty on Muslim students, which limits our understanding of how educators recognise and respond to other types of radicalising influence (Lakhani and James, 2021). At a time of increasing demands on academic staff and changing threat profiles, there is therefore a clear need for research that can provide meaningful insight into university academic staff attitudes towards the expanding scope of their role and how they would respond to cases of suspected student radicalisation. To address this gap, this report presents findings from the largest quantitative analysis to date of academic's willingness and ability to recognise and respond to student radicalisation in British universities.

Factors that influence radicalisation reporting in universities

For educational establishments to fulfil the Prevent duty, staff must be willing and able to identify students who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and know what to do once a concern has been identified (DFE 2015). However, 'radicalisation' is a contested, poorly defined concept that is notoriously difficult to measure (Knusden, 2018; Williams, Horgan & Evans, 2016). DFE guidance recognises "there is no single way of identifying an individual who is likely to be susceptible to a terrorist ideology" and recommends that as with managing other safeguarding risks, staff should be "alert to" changes in behaviour (DFE 2015, p6). Behavioural change is, however, to be expected during the move from adolescence to adulthood, as is the exploration of radical ideas (Lakhani, 2020). Educators therefore have "the often-challenging task to be able to distinguish between "stupid comments" and those that indicate that a student is "at risk"" (Lakhani & James, 2021, p79). This has important implications for the implementation of the Prevent Duty, as lack of certainty about what behavioural indicators of concern may look like is associated with reduced intention to report terrorism concerns and may lead to under-reporting (LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017; Pearce et al. 2019). Consequently, several

studies have questioned whether it is even reasonable for teachers to be asked to identify signs of radicalisation (Moffat & Gerard, 2019; O'Donnell 2016).

Despite challenges associated with recognising radicalisation risk, there is evidence that those with a close relationship with someone who has become involved with violent extremism (so-called 'intimates') are capable of spotting early changes and warning signs that could enable prevention interventions (Grossman 2015, 2019; Thomas et al. 2020). There is also evidence that some teachers feel confident in their ability to recognise at risk students (Busher et al. 2017) and react to concerns of radicalisation in appropriate ways (Parker, Lindekilde & Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2021). Whether this would translate into a university setting where academics tend to have less regular and sustained contact with their students is less clear (Higton et. al 2021). Reporting confidence in school settings is associated with Prevent training and teaching experience (Parker, Lindekilde & Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020). There is also evidence to suggest that it is likely to vary depending on the radicalising influence under consideration. For example, recent research suggests that teachers may be more confident in dealing with issues around Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation in comparison with issues around Islamist radicalisation (Lakhani & James, 2021). Teachers attributed this to greater knowledge and familiarity with far-right concerns. However, this research also found that Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation was often conflated with racism, hate and bullying, which on their own do not sit within the Prevent remit. This suggests that greater confidence may not necessarily lead to more effective implementation of the Prevent Duty and could potentially lead to over-reporting (Lakhani & James, 2021).

Irrespective of their capability of identifying a student at risk of radicalisation, there is evidence of some reluctance among teachers to make Prevent referrals. This has been attributed to concerns relating to negative impacts on classroom practice and teacher/student relationships, as well as concerns about wider negative community impacts of reporting. There are tensions between freedom of expression, the role of classrooms as a safe space for debate and the security concerns underpinning the Prevent Duty (Miah 2017; Elwick & Jerome, 2019). Furthermore, educators have expressed concerns about the potential for loss of trust between students and teachers following referrals (Moffat & Gerrard, 2019), which could result in ""alienation, disaffection and disengagement" of pupils more generally, with wider concerns over academic freedom" (Lakhani & James, 2021, p72.). Studies have also highlighted that some teachers are concerned that the Prevent Duty has a disproportionately negative impact on Muslim students, highlighting the potential for alienation and stigmatisation (Jerome et al. 2019; Taylor and Soni, 2017). For example, a teacher in a Further Education college, when concerned about a Muslim student hesitated about making a referral as she was worried about "interfering with that student's right to be religious" (James, 2020, p152). In a university context, some student unions have refused to implement Prevent policy

regarding external speakers "because the union felt the policy was Islamophobic" (Higton et al. 2021, p9).

There is some evidence to suggest that situating Prevent within a safeguarding framework (i.e. framing the Prevent Duty as an extension of existing responsibilities to protect students from other potential harms, such as child sexual abuse) has been effective in increasing acceptance of the Prevent Duty within schools (Busher et al. 2017; James, 2020; Moffat and Gerrard, 2019). Universities also tend to situate their Prevent policies within a wider safeguarding framework and there is some limited evidence that this approach may have had a similarly positive impact on attitudes towards the Prevent Duty in this context (Higton et al. 2021). However, Prevent leads in this study also noted tensions between their institution's Prevent and freedom of speech polices and identified "a strong philosophical resistance to Prevent" among some academic staff, based on the concept of free speech (Higton et al. 2021, p9). Other factors associated with more positive attitudes towards the Prevent Duty include confidence in institutional processes for dealing with safeguarding issues (Busher et al. 2017). This includes prior experience of working with Prevent officials to create safe spaces for discussions with students about sensitive topics (Parker et al. 2019). A study on the implementation of the Prevent Duty within Further Education also found that informal discussions with colleagues provided reassurance about the appropriateness of making a referral and were considered "a safeguard against making the wrong call" (James, 2020, p152).

In summary, there are several factors with the potential to drive both under- and over-reporting of radicalisation concerns in educational contexts and fulfilling the Prevent Duty within a university environment is likely to pose some specific challenges. Higton et al (2021) draw attention to three key factors that may shape radicalisation reporting in the context of British universities in particular: (i) antipathy towards the Prevent Duty, (ii) free speech values, and (iii) low perceived risk of radicalisation (Higton et al. 2021). However, this research was based on a very limited sample, primarily comprising Prevent leads and safeguarding staff rather than academics. We therefore lack any in-depth understanding of how teaching staff in universities perceive their role in preventing and responding to radicalisation and extremism, and how they would react to a case of suspected radicalisation. This report presents the findings of a study that was designed to address this gap. Specifically, this study aims to understand (i) How do academics teaching in British universities perceive the risk of radicalisation in universities and their role in identifying and responding to signs of possible radicalisation? (ii) What factors shape the attitudes of academics teaching in British universities regarding their role in recognising and responding to cases of suspected student radicalisation? (iii) What factors influence academics teaching in British universities' actions when faced with a case of suspected student radicalisation?

Methodology

Research Design

This study employed a survey experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three scenarios: (1) low concern, (2) ambiguous, or (3) high concern. In all three scenarios participants were asked to make a judgment about one of their personal tutees 'Adam' who they had been in touch with several times recently due to concerns about poor attendance. This background context was provided as the Prevent referral process takes into consideration personal problems affecting an individual's wellbeing that could increase vulnerability (Higton et al. 2021). The frequent, recent contact would also make it more realistic that the academic would know the student well enough to be able to recognise behavioural change. All three scenarios involved Adam expressing anger about the university's LGBTQ+ society holding an event on campus on the basis that "the Student Union should not be promoting these abhorrent lifestyles". In Condition 1 he is overheard expressing this opinion to a friend, in Condition 2 he is distributing a leaflet calling for the Student Union to stop supporting the LGBTQ+ society, and in Condition 3 he is playing a central role in a protest outside the LGBTQ+ event that later becomes violent (see Appendix 1 for the full text for each scenario).

These scenarios were adapted from a validated hypothetical scenario used in previous studies analysing factors that influence community and teachers' reporting of radicalisation (Thomas et. al 2017; Parker et al. 2020). The authors also discussed and tested the scenarios with Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) professionals and academics to ensure real-world applicability. We selected anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment as this is associated with a variety of extremist ideologies and this allowed us to test the assumptions that participants made about likely radicalising influences. We designed the scenarios so that a high level of reporting in the low-concern scenario (Condition 1) could be interpreted as indicating a tendency to over-report and reporting in the high-concern scenario (Condition 3) would indicate a tendency for under-reporting. This assumption reflects guidance regarding situations when it is considered appropriate to make referrals to the Channel programme (Higton et al. 2021). We also included a manipulation check which confirmed that participants similarly interpreted these scenarios as being of increasing concern. The results of the manipulation check are presented in Appendix 1.

After reading the scenario, participants were asked to indicate how likely they would be to undertake a range of response options from taking no action, to informally discussing the situation with Adam or colleagues through to making a formal report. They were also asked to indicate their confidence in selecting which action they would take, and whether they thought there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that radicalisation had occurred in the scenario. Finally, they were asked to select from a list of influences they

thought could be involved in Adam's radicalisation. This list was designed to be as broad as possible, including all influences that have been discussed in the context of radicalisation to avoid biasing responses towards the influences that the authors thought would be most likely associated with bigotry towards the LGBTQ+ community. Participants were also provided with an opportunity to attribute another influence or to indicate that they did not know what had influenced Adam's views.

The second section of the survey focused on beliefs about radicalisation at universities. These questions were designed to establish what types of influence academics consider to be of most concern in a university context, the extent to which they consider radicalisation to be a risk, and the impact that COVID-19 has had on perceived radicalisation risk, as well as their ability to identify signs of radicalisation. A measure of attitudes towards freedom of speech was also included as the concept of free speech is associated with strong philosophical objections to the Prevent duty (Higton et al. 2021). Participants were also asked about their academic experience, and whether they had any direct previous experience with a student of concern, about their knowledge and experience of Prevent training and guidance, and about their attitudes towards reporting (see Appendix 2 for the full text of the survey).

COVID-19 related impacts on the study design

This project was originally due to commence in February 2020, but due to the increased burden faced by academic staff caused by the sudden shift to online teaching due to COVID-19, the start date was delayed by 12 months. When this decision was taken, we had hoped there would be return to normal teaching patterns in 2021 and this postponement would allow the project to be delivered as originally conceived. However, when data collection commenced, most teaching was still being delivered remotely. While the move to online teaching did not alter the primary aims and objectives of the project, we recognised that it would likely influence attitudes towards and the ability of academic staff to enact the Prevent duty. For example, opportunities for informal observations and interventions were likely to be limited by the lack of face-to-face contact. We therefore asked participants to assume for the purpose of the scenario that teaching had resumed on campus. This allowed us to describe situations where an academic might directly observe behaviours of varying degrees of concern outside of the classroom. We also included some additional questions to establish how our participants perceived the impact of COVID-19 on the risk of radicalisation and their ability to identify and respond to suspected student radicalisation.

Data collection and sample characteristics

We were unable to identify any professional polling companies that had access to a sufficiently large panel of academics working in British universities to enable them to run this survey on our behalf. We therefore compiled our own database of potential participants using information provided on staff lists on public-facing university websites in England, Wales and Scotland. We focused on these regions as the Prevent duty does not apply in Northern Ireland. We included staff from all academic disciplines and faculties, but as we were interested in the attitudes and experiences of academic staff with teaching responsibilities, we used job titles to exclude any roles that were exclusively research focused. We also distributed the survey via the project team's academic networks. To confirm eligibility, we asked participants to indicate before completing the survey if they are "employed as an academic with teaching responsibilities at a UK university". Participants could not proceed beyond this screen without responding to this question and anyone who ticked the box to indicate that they were not employed in this capacity were screened out and thanked for their time.

We ran the study online using Qualtrics survey software. Data collection ran from 15th June 2021 until 30th November 2021. Before beginning the survey, participants were informed about the purpose of the study. They were also provided with a link to the funders to confirm that this was an independent piece of academic research and provided with full details regarding the way that their data would be collected, stored and used. They were then asked to tick a box to indicate if they would be happy to proceed on this basis. Participants could not proceed beyond this screen without responding to this question and anyone who ticked the box to indicate that they did not wish to proceed were screened out and thanked for their time. The study was approved by the King's College London Research Ethics Committee.

The final dataset comprised 1003 academics teaching in British universities. 46 (3.4%) had 0-2 years teaching experience, 296 (21.8%) had 3-10 years teaching experience and 523 (38.6%) had over 11 years of teaching experience. 424 (31.3%) were in the low-concern scenario (Condition 1), 398 (29.4%) were in the ambiguous scenario (Condition 2), and 395 (29.1%) were in the high-concern scenario (Condition 3). Of those who indicated whether they had participated in training on the Prevent Duty, 38.7% reported they had participated in some training (either face-to-face or online) and 61.3% reported that they had not received any training.

Measures

Participants in all conditions were presented with the same 10 response options following the scenario. One described taking no action, five described taking informal actions (four of which involved discussions with Adam or colleagues at the university and one of which

involved informally discussing the case with external P/CVE professionals), and four described formal reporting actions (one involved internal reporting via the safeguarding/student welfare lead at the university, three via external reporting routes). The full list of response options is presented in Appendix 2. Participants were asked to rate how likely they were to undertake each action on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 'very unlikely' (1) to 'very likely' (7). Intention to take informal actions was measured using 4 items (α = .76) and intention to formally report concerns was also measured using 4 items (α = .77). The item "Informally discuss the case with a government official, such as a police officer or local authority Prevent officer (e.g. phone call)" was excluded because it correlated poorly with the other informal action items, which suggests that participants considered any contact with external authorities to be qualitatively different from internal informal discussions about the case.

To explore factors influencing reporting intentions we included a set of covariates: teaching experience, free speech attitudes, Prevent awareness, Prevent training, prior experience of radicalisation concern and attitudes towards reporting (comprising role commitment, response confidence and reporting consequence). Teaching experience was measured by number of years teaching in Higher Education (0-2 years, 3-10 years or 11+ years). Free speech attitudes were measured using a three-item scale (α = .76), which replicated Gorden and Ifante's (1980) free speech scale. Prevent training was measured using two items with yes/no response options to capture online and face-to-face training experience. As Prevent awareness and Prevent training were highly correlated (r=.66) we excluded Prevent awareness from our regression model. Prior experience of radicalisation concern used a single measure, which asked participants to indicate whether they have "ever had contact with a student where you have been worried that they could be vulnerable to radicalisation?" with a yes/no response.

Role commitment, response confidence and reporting consequence were adapted from the three sub-dimensions of the Teacher Reporting Attitude Scale (TRAS) that was developed to measure the attitudes of teachers towards reporting radicalisation in schools (Parker, Lindekilde and Gøtzsche-Astrup, 2020). Role commitment was measured using a four-item scale to capture attitudes towards reporting vulnerability to radicalisation (α = .91). High values indicate high commitment to reporting radicalisation. Response confidence was measured using a four-item scale to capture confidence in the ability of authorities to respond effectively to reports of radicalisation (α = .72). The first three items were reversed, while the last item ("I believe that the current system for reporting vulnerability to radicalisation is effective in addressing the problem") was not. High values indicate high confidence that reporting will lead to effective action. Reporting consequence used a six-item scale to capture concerns about the negative consequences associated with reporting (α = .71). The seventh item ("I would be concerned about the safety and security of others if I did not report") was excluded from the analysis because it correlated poorly with other consequence items. All items

included in the consequence index were reversed to allow the three sub-dimensions of TRAS to be combined to calculate a total attitudinal score. High values indicate low concern about the negative consequences of reporting (i.e. a positive attitude towards reporting). For all three TRAS subscales the combined measure was rescaled to range from 0-1.

Results

Beliefs about radicalisation at universities

Table 1 shows that participants were uncertain about the likelihood that a student at their university could be radicalised (M=4.25, SD=1.55) and about the risk of radicalisation among British university students more widely (M=4.06, SD=1.52). They were also unsure whether students are more likely to have been exposed to radicalising content when studying remotely (M=4.03, SD=1.32) or more likely to have been radicalised during the COVID-19 pandemic (M=3.96. SD=1.24). They were, however, more certain that changes to teaching due to COVID-19 restrictions would mean that they would be less likely to be aware of a student becoming radicalised (M=5.31, SD=1.42), with 78.3% of participants agreeing with the statement 'Changes to teaching due to COVID-19 restrictions mean I would be less likely to be aware of a student becoming radicalised'. Most participants (73.7%) also agreed that student societies should be allowed to host any speaker who is not breaking the law.

Variable	N	Mean (SD)	Min	Max
It is likely that a student at my university could be radicalised	919	4.25 (1.55)	1	7
University students in the UK are at risk of radicalisation	919	4.06 (1.52)	1	7
Students are more likely to be radicalised when studying remotely	919	4.04 (1.32)	1	7
Students are more likely to be radicalized during the COVID-19 pandemic	919	3.96 (1.24)	1	7
Changes to teaching due to COVID-19 restrictions mean I would be less likely to be aware of a student becoming radicalised.	919	5.31 (1.42)	1	7
Student societies should be allowed to host any speaker who is not breaking the law	919	5.32 (1.69)	1	7

Table 1: Means (standard deviations) for beliefs about radicalisation at British universities

Participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 (where 1= no influence and 10 = a very important influence) seven potential radicalising influences on Higher Education students in the UK. Figure 1 shows that participants were also uncertain about these influences, as their ratings clustered around the midpoint of the scale. Far Right was the only potential radicalising influence that most participants rated in the top half of the scale, with 58.2% rating this as ≥6. Mixed or non-specific ideology was considered to have the least influence (with 72.3% rating this as ≤5). This was also the influence where

most uncertainty was expressed. Animal rights (67.6%), Environmentalism (63.4%), Incel (63.4%), Far Left (62.5%) and Islamist (59.1%) were also rated by most participants to be on the lower half of the scale.

Figure 1: Potential radicalising influences on British university students

Attitudes towards reporting radicalisation at universities

Participants on average held ambivalent attitudes towards reporting concern about radicalisation (0.49 on a 0-1 scale). Table 2 shows that participants were concerned by reporting they may get an innocent student into trouble (mean = 5.29, SD=1.49) and felt they would find it difficult to recognise the appropriate threshold for reporting vulnerabilities to radicalisation (mean = 5.45, 1.37). This likely reflects the fact that 61.3% reported that they had not received any training on the Prevent Duty. Furthermore, of the participants who indicated that they had untaken any type of training on the Prevent Duty, 57.8% indicated that they had not found it useful, 10% were unsure if it had been useful and only 32.2% reported that it was useful.

Variable	N	Mean (SD)	Min	Max
It is important for academics to be involved in reporting radicalisation to prevent negative consequences for students	893	3.95 (1.83)	1	7
Reporting vulnerability to radicalisation is necessary for the safety of young people	893	4.14 (1.76)	1	7
Radicalisation reporting guidelines are necessary for academics	893	4.12 (1.63)	1	7
I plan to report vulnerability to radicalisation when I suspect it	893	4.12 (1.63)	1	7
Commitment index	**893**	**0.53 (0.27)**	**0**	**1**
I lack confidence in the local authority to respond effectively to reports of radicalisation	893	4.53 (1.48)	1	7
I lack confidence in the police to respond effectively to reports of radicalisation	893	4.41 (1.63)	1	7
It is a waste of time to report concerns about radicalisation to the police	893	3.58 (1.29)	1	7
I believe the current system for reporting vulnerability is effective in addressing the problem	893	3.31 (1.38)	1	7
Response confidence index	**893**	**0.55 (0.18)**	**0**	**1**
I would be uncertain how to properly report concerns around student vulnerability to radicalisation	870	4.81 (1.71)	1	7
I would be reluctant to report a case because it could damage my relationship with the student	870	3.72 (1.64)	1	7
I would be apprehensive to report vulnerability to radicalisation for fear of family/community retaliation	870	3.02 (1.58)	1	7
Academics who fail to report even minor concerns about student vulnerability to radicalisation could get into trouble	870	3.27 (1.40)	1	7
I would find it difficult to report vulnerabilities to radicalisation as it is hard to recognise the appropriate threshold	870	5.45 (1.37)	1	7
I would be concerned by reporting I may get an innocent student into trouble	870	5.29 (1.49)	1	7
I would be concerned about the safety and security of others if I did not report.	870	4.65 (1.56)	1	7
Reporting consequence index	**870**	**0.46 (0.16)**	**0**	**1**
Overall TRAS score	**870**	**0.49 (1.46)**	**0**	**1**

Table 2: Attitudes towards reporting suspected radicalisation

Factors influencing reporting attitudes

Using the scores for role commitment, response confidence and reporting consequence, we investigated the influence of teaching experience, free speech attitudes, Prevent training and prior experience of dealing with a student of radicalisation concern (prior

worry) on reporting attitudes. Table 3 shows that junior academics were more likely to indicate commitment to the role as a reporter of radicalisation concern, with academics with 3-10 years teaching experience significantly less likely to demonstrate commitment to this role than academics with less than 2 years of teaching experience (b=-0.10, SE=0.04, p<0.05) and academics with 11+ years teaching experience also significantly less likely to demonstrate commitment to reporting radicalisation concern (b=-0.12, SE=0.04, p<0.01). Higher scores on the free speech scale predicted a significant drop in role commitment (b=-0.37, SE=0.03, p<0.01) and lower confidence in the system to handle reported concerns of radicalisation in an appropriate manner (b=-0.10, SE=0.02, p<0.01). In contrast, Prevent Training significantly increased role commitment (b=0.05, SE=0.02, p<0.01) and reduced concern about negative consequences of reporting (b=0.07, SE=0.01, p<0.001). Prior experience of being concerned about student radicalisation similarly predicted both significantly increased role commitment (b=0.08, SE=0.02, p<0.001) and significantly reduced concern about the negative consequences of reporting (b=0.06, SE=0.01, p<0.001).

	Commitment (n=858)	Confidence (n=858)	Consequence (n=858)
Teaching experience (3-10 years) [+]	-0.10* (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Teaching experience (11+ years) [+]	-0.12** (0.03)	-0.004 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Free speech attitude	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Prevent training	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Prior worry	0.08*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Constant	0.80*** (0.04)	0.51*** (0.03)	0.44*** (0.01)
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.03	0.07

Note: [+]reference= teaching experience 0-2 years. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3: Covariates of reporting attitudes

Impact of scenario seriousness on reporting intentions

Table 4 shows that the seriousness of the scenario decreased the likelihood of intended inaction, with participants in Condition 3 significantly less likely to intend doing nothing than participants in both Condition 2 (difference in means -0.41, p<0.05 two-tailed test) and Condition 1 (difference in means -0.64, p<0.001 two-tailed test). It also increased intention to report the case to a safeguarding/student welfare lead, with participants in Condition 3 significantly more likely to intend reporting than participants in both Condition 2 (difference in means -0.46, p<0.01 two-tailed test) and Condition 1 (difference in means

1.15, p<0.001 two-tailed test), and participants in Condition 2 significantly more likely to intend reporting than participants in Condition 1 (difference in means 0.69, p<0.001 two-tailed test). However, even in the high concern scenario, participants indicated uncertainty about whether they would report the case to a safeguarding/student welfare lead (mean=4.07, SD=2.13).

This likely reflects uncertainty as to whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that radicalisation has occurred in the scenario. While participants in Condition 3 were significantly more likely to agree with this statement than participants in either Condition 2 (difference in means 0.46, p<0.001, two-tailed test) or Condition 1 (difference in means 0.93, p<0.001, two-tailed test), they nonetheless expressed uncertainty that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting radicalisation had occurred (mean=3.96, SD=0.81) with only 35.2% indicating that they agreed with this statement (comprising 19.9% somewhat agreed, 13.1% agreed and 2.2% strongly agreed).

Across all conditions, the most common intended action was to discuss the case with an academic colleague to obtain their views, with 80.4% of participants in Condition 3 reporting that they would be likely to take this action. Participants also indicated that they might consider discussing the case with someone from professional services or the safeguarding/student welfare lead. When it comes to formal reporting, 49.2% of participants in Condition 3 indicated they would be likely to report the case to a safeguarding/student welfare lead at the university, although only 15.2% reported that they would be very likely to do this. Across all conditions, participants reported that they would be very unlikely to contact external authorities.

	Condition1 (Low concern) n=352 Mean (SD)	Condition 2 (Ambiguous) n=336 Mean (SD)	Condition 3 (High concern) n=315 (Mean (SD)
Take no specific action	3.59 (2.29)	3.36 (2.23)	2.95 (2.14)
Discuss with Adam	3.80 (2.10)	3.56 (2.10)	3.65 (2.09)
Discuss with academic colleague	5.16 (1.97)	5.46 (1.86)	5.37 (1.89)
Discuss with professional services colleague	3.79 (2.14)	4.04 (2.19)	4.35 (2.16)
Informally discuss with safeguarding lead	4.07 (2.12)	4.33 (2.27)	4.70 (2.13)
Report the case to safeguarding lead	2.92 (1.98)	3.61 (2.28)	4.07 (2.13)
Informally discuss with government official	1.36 (0.86)	1.56 (1.12)	1.87 (1.35)
Report the case to Prevent team	1.43 (1.02)	1.72 (1.32)	1.97 (1.55)
Call the anti-terrorism hotline	1.24 (0.76)	1.37 (0.90)	1.54 (1.09)
Contact DfE counter-extremism hotline	1.35 (0.92)	1.59 (1.20)	1.60 (1.25)

Note: All scores coded 1-7 where 1=very unlikely, 7= very likely.

Table 4: Means (standard deviations) of intended actions by condition

Predicting the reporting of suspected radicalisation

Figure 2 and Table 5 show the influence of the experimental condition (radicalisation concern) on intention to do nothing, take informal action and report when also taking into consideration years of teaching experience, free speech attitudes, reporting attitudes (role commitment, response confidence, reporting consequence), Prevent training and prior experience of radicalisation concern (prior worry). Viewing the high concern scenario (b=-0.11, SE=0.10, p<0.001), having high role commitment (b=-0.27, SE=0.05, p<0.001), limited concerns about the negative consequences of reporting (b=-0.16, SE=0.08, p<0.05) and having had some Prevent training (b=-0.07, SE=0.03, p<0.01) were all associated with a lower likelihood of doing nothing. Increased intention to report was associated with being in the medium-concern (b=0.06, SE=0.01, p<0.001) or high-concern conditions (b=0.10, SE=0.01, p<0.001) and having higher role commitment (b=0.20, SE=0.02, p<0.001). Participants who scored highly on the free speech measure were less likely to intend formally reporting (b=-0.15, SE=0.02, p<0.001).

Figure 2: Marginal effects plots showing covariates of reaction intentions

	Doing nothing (n=858)	Informal reaction (n=858)	Formal reaction (n=858)
Condition 2[+]	-0.06 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Condition 3[+]	-0.11*** (0.10)	0.04* (0.02)	0.10*** (0.01)
Teaching experience (3-10 years) [++]	-0.002 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.03)
Teaching experience (11+ years) [++]	0.08 (0.06)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.05 (0.03)
Free speech attitude	0.24*** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.04)	-0.15*** (0.03)
Role commitment	-0.27*** (0.05)	0.26*** (0.04)	0.20*** (0.02)
Response confidence	0.08 (0.08)	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.01 (0.04)
Reporting consequence	-0.16* (0.08)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.05 (0.04)
Prevent training	-0.06** (0.03)	0.03* (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Prior worry	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.003 (0.02)
Constant	0.49*** (0.08)	0.61*** (0.06)	0.11** (0.04)
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.15	0.24

Note: [+]reference=condition 1, [++]reference= teaching experience 0-2 years. Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: Covariates of reaction intentions

Table 6 shows covariates of reaction intentions for the high-concern condition only. This clearly shows that role commitment is the most important influence on reaction intentions in the scenario where it would be appropriate under the Prevent Duty for an academic to consider taking action. Specifically, it signicantly reduces intention to do nothing (b=-0.29, SE=0.09, p<0.001), and significantly increases the chances of both informally discussing the case (b=0.34, SE=0.06, p<0.001) and formally reporting the case (b=0.25, SE=0.05, p<0.001). Free speech attitude is the only other factor that significantly influences intention to formally report in this scenario, with stronger beliefs in the importance of free speech associated with a reduced intention to report (b=-0.12, SE=0.05, p<0.01).

	Doing nothing (n=269)	Informal reaction (n=269)	Formal reaction (n=269)
Teaching experience (3-10 years) [++]	0.01 (0.11)	0.08 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)
Teaching experience (11+ years) [++]	0.05 (0.11)	0.06 (0.08)	-0.020 (0.06)
Free speech attitude	0.18 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.12** (0.05)
Role commitment	-0.29*** (0.09)	0.34*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.05)
Response confidence	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.11 (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)
Reporting consequence	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.10 (0.09)	0.04 (0.07)
Prevent training	-0.07 (0.84)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Prior worry	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Constant	0.44** (0.15)	0.48*** (0.01)	0.08 (0.08)
Adjusted R^2	0.10	0.14	0.25

Note: [+]reference=condition 1, [++]reference= teaching experience 0-2 years. Standard errors in parentheses
* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 6: Covariates of reaction intentions for Condition 3 (high concern) only.

Discussion

How is the risk of radicalisation in British universities perceived?

Our findings suggest that academics working in British universities are uncertain about the likelihood that students within their own or other universities are at risk of radicalisation. This likely reflects the fact that most of our participants had no direct experience of Prevent training or of dealing with a student of concern – i.e. it suggests lack of knowledge. However, it may also reflect the fact that 'radicalisation' is a contested and ambiguous concept (Knudsen, 2018; Williams, Horgan & Evans, 2016), something that academics may be more likely to push back on than other types of survey respondent. Although we didn't have capacity to include open-ended responses in our survey, nine participants chose to provide qualitative feedback via email. Commonly raised concerns included questions about the concepts of extremism and radicalisation. For example:

> *"I would like to add that I think the concept of 'extremism' to be extremely problematic, especially when defined by politicians in the Home Office. The early Christians and Puritans were the 'extremists' of their day" (R1)*

> *"The idea that we can treat a wide and diverse range of political, moral and religious belief under catch-all categories such as 'radicalisation' and*

'extremism' is completely misconceived. There is no single thing called 'radicalisation' that applies to them all." (R6)

Furthermore, several participants questioned the list of potential radicalising influences that they were asked to consider. As previously noted, this list was designed to include all influences that have been discussed in the context of radicalisation to avoid biasing responses. However, the inclusion of environmentalism on the list was considered by some participants to be problematic, two of whom declined to complete the survey on this basis:

"I hadn't got far into the survey before I was presented with a question that asked me to rate Environmentalism as a topic of radicalisation alongside e.g. Far Left and Far Right ideology. I really have a problem with this as I regard environmentalism as a completely legitimate viewpoint, and indeed radical environmentalism is possibly the only rational response to the current state of the world." (R5)

"An environmental radical such as myself, according to your survey, is a 'baddie,' on a par with a fascist. That is even though the world is being driven to terrible climate horrors by the policies which your survey looks kindly upon, as 'good' and 'moderate.'" (R9)

While these comments are consistent with previous research that has highlighted ideological objections to the Prevent programme within higher education (Higton et al. 2021), it is important to note that they are unlikely to have been provided by a representative sub-sample and we received a similar number of positive responses from participants who indicated that they had found the survey interesting and would be interested in reading our results. These comments do, however, provide some useful insight into how at least some of our participants interpreted the survey questions and might help further explain the tendency for questions about radicalisation likelihood and influences to cluster around the neutral mid-point of the scale.

The fact that Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation was considered the most likely radicalising influence is consistent with most recent referral figures (Home Office, 2021). This suggests that our participants may be more knowledgeable about the current threat landscape than their responses to more general questions about radicalisation may suggest. However, as around a third of our participants also attributed the radicalisation of Adam in our scenario to Far Right influences it is possible that the scenario may have had some influence on front of mind concerns. Furthermore, mixed, unstable or unclear ideology (the second most commonly referral type last year) was considered by our participants to be the least likely influence on student radicalisation among British university students, which indicates that further training may be required for academics working in British universities to recognise the current threat profile.

What factors shape radicalisation reporting attitudes?

In comparison with an earlier study that employed the same measure of radicalisation reporting attitudes in schools (Parker et al. 2020), we found that academics working in British universities held relatively negative attitudes towards reporting concern about radicalisation in comparison with British school teachers (.49 vs. .66 on a 0-1 scale). This ambivalence about reporting was driven by concerns about getting an innocent student into trouble and concerns about the difficulty of recognising the appropriate threshold for reporting. This lends support to the interpretation that the previously noted mid-scale responses to questions about the likelihood of radicalisation reflect genuine uncertainty and are not simply a methodological artefact. The fact that Prevent training was significantly associated with increased role commitment and reduced concern about the negative impacts of reporting underscores the role that training can play in boosting knowledge and confidence. This suggests that Prevent training may be more useful than responses to our survey suggest (57.8% of those who had undertaken training indicated they had not found it useful). However, given these negative ratings it would be useful to undertake further research to establish why those who had participated in Prevent training did not feel that it had been particularly useful.

While Parker et al. (2020) found that more experienced teachers in British schools (measured in years of experience) were more likely to feel role commitment as a reporter of concern, we found that the opposite was true of academics working in British universities. This may be partially explained by the fact that Prevent guidance/training tends to be delivered to new staff (Higton et al. 2021). However, low levels of training uptake in our sample suggest that this cannot be the sole explanation and further research is therefore required to explain decreasing role commitment with increasing years of experience of university teaching. We also found that positive attitudes towards the importance of free speech were associated with feeling less role commitment, as well as less confidence in the system's ability to effectively handle reported cases of concern. Consistent with Higton et al. (2021) we also found that free speech was generally important to our participants, which helps to explain overall ambivalence to reporting. Qualitative feedback provided by email also underscored the link between the philosophy of free speech and antipathy towards Prevent:

> *"I'll just comment that I believe the role of universities is to promote knowledge and tolerance, and to fight against ignorance and bigotry, and not to do police work for the state." (R5)*

> *"I want to say that reporting of students by academics I believe is a road to fascism type activities. Governments have always selected students and radical groups always have too. I would be worried that this kind of Report Duty would further erode academic freedom. It is already eroded when an*

academic can [sic] present different views for fear of insulting a staff member or a student." (R7).

As discussed in the introduction there is an inherent challenge in balancing a university's commitment to academic freedoms and freedom of speech, with Prevent safeguarding policies, that is felt by staff working within university safeguarding teams (Higton et al, 2021). It is crucial that this is taken into consideration when implementing Prevent policies and in Prevent training if academics are to feel confident to raise concerns about potential radicalisation. Although our findings demonstrate concern among some academics working in British universities about the effectiveness of local authority and police responses to reports of radicalisation, they also show that past experience of dealing with a student where they were worried that they could be vulnerable to radicalisation significantly increased role commitment and significantly reduced concerns about the potential negative impacts to the student of reporting. This suggests that those who have engaged with their university's safeguarding team were likely to have had a positive experience. This is consistent with previous research with teachers in British schools, which found that prior experience of engaging with Prevent teams led to more positive attitudes towards reporting students of concern (Parker et al. 2019).

What factors influence reporting intentions?

We employed three hypothetical scenarios of increasing seriousness to examine factors that would influence reporting intentions. Response options were grouped into three sets: do nothing, informal response (i.e. discussing the case with the student of the concern or with colleagues) or formal response (i.e. reporting to internal or external authorities). Across all three scenarios, the most common response was to informally discuss the case with an academic colleague or colleagues to get their views, followed by informally discussing the case with a safeguarding/student welfare lead. This is consistent with previous research in Further Education colleges, which also found that teachers wanted to sense check their concerns before taking them any further (James, 2020). Most participants indicated that they would be unlikely to do nothing in response to any of the scenarios (with this intention decreasing as the scenario seriousness increased). The least likely set of intended actions were to contact external authorities, either formally or informally, irrespective of scenario seriousness. There is therefore no evidence to indicate a tendency for over-reporting among academics teaching in British universities and some evidence to suggest that there may be reticence to report radicalisation concern even in situations where it could be considered appropriate to seek further advice.

Scenario seriousness, increased role commitment, decreased concern about potential negative consequences of reporting and having had some Prevent training were all associated with less likelihood of doing nothing. Scenario seriousness and increased role

commitment were also positively associated with the intention to report. Higher scores on the free speech attitude measure were negatively associated with intention to report. Focusing specifically on Condition 3 (the only scenario where it would be appropriate to report according to Prevent guidelines), role commitment was the most important influencing factor on reporting intention. As previously discussed, role commitment is predicted by having fewer years of university teaching experience and having had some Prevent training. This suggests that more experienced university lecturers might benefit from undertaking training to better understand the signs of potential vulnerability to radicalisation. However, as free speech attitudes also indirectly influence reporting intention (via their influence on role commitment), this training would also need to address concerns about contradictions between the Prevent Duty and academic freedom/freedom of speech, and the extent to which it is possible to resolve these tensions with any credibility is unclear.

Methodological limitations

Our study is subject to the methodological limitations associated with all survey studies. Firstly, the use of self-report data means that results may be subject to social desirability bias, although there is evidence to suggest that online surveys may produce more truthful responses than face-to-face interviews or telephone surveys (Ornstein, 2013). Despite having built a database of randomly sampled university teaching staff, there is also the issue of sample bias. Given competing time pressures faced by academic staff it is likely that people who chose to take part in the study would be more interested in this topic and hold stronger views (either positively or negatively) than would a representative sample of academics working in British universities. However, the amount of uncertainty expressed by our respondents, and lack of prior Prevent training provides some reassurance that we were not only tapping into what could be considered to be particularly expert respondents.

A further potential limitation is that we used hypothetical scenarios to measure reporting intentions rather than actual reporting behaviours. This is consistent with previous research on attitudes towards reporting terrorism related concerns (Parker et al. 2020; Parker et al 2021; Pearce et al. 2019) and allowed us to manipulate the seriousness of the scenario to address questions that have been raised regarding whether teaching staff at British universities are likely to over burden the Prevent programme by making unnecessary referrals (Lakhani & James, 2021). Although behavioural intentions are a key determinant of behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), other factors such as social norms, habit and volitional control are also likely to influence actual behaviours (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). While we can therefore confidently speak to the differences between conditions, caution must be applied when interpreting the extent to which these findings reflect the actions our respondents would take were they to be faced with a student of concern in real life.

Several qualitative responses that were spontaneously provided, also raise some questions about the extent to which our respondents felt that they were expected to interpret the scenario as being of concern. Although we did not frame any of the scenarios as such in our introduction - and indeed intentionally included a scenario that would not meet the criteria for being considered a case for concern under the Prevent guidelines – a few participants clearly assumed that we thought that they should report the case. For example:

> *"Thank you for this survey. It was an interesting exercise. I do, however, have some problem with the opening case, where Adam is presented as, reading between the lines, a person who during his absenteeism from lectures etc has become radicalised […] I am disturbed that this case is presented as being an example of a radicalised person, where it really is another opinion, perhaps gone a bit too far by not allowing a platform to people with another view than his (and that can be considered radicalised, but not an incitement to violence)" (R3)*

It was beyond the scope of the current study to include a qualitative component but given the conceptual ambiguity of the concept of radicalisation and the complexity of balancing concerns about academic freedoms with security issues and student safeguarding, future research would benefit from including an interview component.

Conclusions

This study employed a survey experiment to examine the willingness and ability of academics teaching in British universities to recognise and respond to student radicalisation. Overall, our findings suggest that academics are ambivalent towards their role in reporting radicalisation concern. These findings also suggest that academics are less confident than their counterparts in schools in recognising appropriate thresholds for reporting and are concerned about the potential negative consequences of reporting a student of concern. Our study also further demonstrates the importance of free speech values to academics, which underpin strong philosophical objections to the Prevent Duty held by some members of the Higher Education community. Free speech values coupled with uncertainty and lack of confidence in the way that the authorities deal with students of concern underpin reporting ambivalence which may reduce the likelihood that academics would report a student of concern.

Uptake of Prevent training in our sample was low, and most who had undertaken any training indicated that they had not found it particularly useful. Despite this, Prevent training was positively associated with increased commitment to the role of reporting students of concern and also reduced concerns about the negative consequences of reporting, suggesting that it may play an important role in supporting universities to fulfil

the Prevent Duty. Our findings suggest that Prevent training could be enhanced by targeting more experienced academics and by tackling concerns about the tensions between the Prevent Duty and freedom of speech policies and values. However, for this training to be effective it is essential that it is credible for an audience that is used to engaging with deep thinking on challenging issues.

Appendix 1: Manipulation check

Mean score on Q19 "Thinking back to the case of Adam, how worried does that case make you in terms of Adam potentially being radicalized" by treatment condition.

Condition	Observations	Mean	Std. err.	95% confidence interval	
Condition 1	273	1.754	0.329	1.689	1.819
Condition 2	269	1.873	0.036	1.802	1.945
Condition 3	232	2.081	0.038	2.006	2.157

Note: 1 indicates 'not worried at all', 2 'slightly worried' and 3 'very worried'.

Point estimates on Q19 "Thinking back to the case of Adam, how worried does that case make you in terms of Adam potentially being radicalized" by treatment condition.

95% confidence intervals

Condition	Difference in means
1 vs. 2	.1190272 *
1 vs. 3	.3273278 ***
2 vs. 3	.2082906 ***

Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 based on two-tailed tests. n=1003.

Appendix 2: Full text of survey

<u>SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT</u>

Thank you for your interest in this study, which has been funded by the [Society for Research into Higher Education](). This survey is being conducted by researchers at King's College London and Aarhus University. It should not take more than 10 minutes to complete.

We are interested in UK Higher Education academic staff attitudes towards their role in identifying and responding to suspected student radicalisation. Your responses to this survey will help us to understand how the Prevent Duty is being enacted in universities.

If you are happy to proceed, you will be presented with some information and questions about how you would respond to a hypothetical scenario involving a student, before being asked some basic background questions.

S1. Please indicate below if you are employed as an academic with teaching responsibilities at a UK university.

1	Yes, I am employed as an academic with teaching responsibilities at a UK university
2	No, I am not employed as an academic with teaching responsibilities at a UK university

[PARTICIPANTS WERE SCREENED OUT IF S1=CODE 2]

Before we go on, there are some points that we would like to make sure you are aware of:

• We would like to assure you that all of the information we collect will be kept in the strictest confidence and used for the purposes of research only. It will not be possible to identify any individual in the reporting of results.

• We may share the data from this survey with other research teams and public-sector partners interested in this topic. The data may also be used in academic publications. If we do this, we will first make sure that you cannot be identified from the data.

• Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw from it at any time without giving a reason up until the point of submission. Submission of a completed questionnaire implies consent.

• As participation is anonymous it will not be possible for us to withdraw your data once you have submitted your questionnaire.

- Data collected in this survey will be treated in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and King's College London guidelines.
- If you would like further information about the survey you can contact Julia Pearce at King's College London at Julia.Pearce@kcl.ac.uk.

- If this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and information: The Chair, War Studies Group Research Ethics Panel, King's College London rec@kcl.ac.uk.

If you are happy to take part in the study, please indicate below

- I have read and understood the above information, and I consent to participate in this study.
- I do not wish to participate in this study.

SECTION 2: INTENDED BEHAVIOUR - REPORTING

You are about to be presented with a hypothetical scenario, which assumes that teaching has resumed on campus. Please read the short description carefully and answer the questions that follow. *[PARTICIPANTS WERE RANDOMLY ALLOCATED INTO ONE OF 3 CONDITIONS, WHERE THEY SEE EITHER TEXT 1, TEXT 2 OR TEXT 3.]*

Text 1:
Adam is one of your undergraduate personal tutees who you have been in touch with several times recently due to concerns about poor attendance. As you are briefly waiting for another class to leave the room that you are about to use for a lecture, you hear Adam talking to his friends about the university's LGBTQ+ Society. Adam is expressing anger that the society are being allowed to hold an event on campus and says that the Student Union should not be promoting these abhorrent lifestyles.

Text 2:
Adam is one of your undergraduate personal tutees who you have been in touch with several times recently due to concerns about poor attendance. As you arrive on campus one morning, Adam is among a group of students at the entrance who are handing out leaflets and angrily calling for an event that is being hosted by the university's LGBTQ+ Society to be banned. The leaflet calls for the Student Union to stop supporting the society as it should not be promoting these abhorrent lifestyles.

Text 3
Adam is one of your undergraduate personal tutees who you have been in touch with several times recently due to concerns about poor attendance. As you are leaving campus one evening you see a group of protesters shouting and waving banners outside

a hall where the university's LGBTQ+ Society is hosting a debate. Adam is at the front of this group, holding a banner which advocates for the removal of LGBTQ+ communities and you hear him angrily protesting that the Student Union should not be promoting these abhorrent lifestyles. The next day you hear that the protest became violent later in the evening.

Q1. If you were the personal tutor in this scenario, please indicate how likely you would be to do any of the following.

Please select one answer for each statement [RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]

1	Take no specific action at this time
2	Contact Adam and ask him for a meeting to discuss his actions
3	Discuss the case with an academic colleague or colleagues to get their views
4	Discuss the case with someone from professional services (e.g. from the undergraduate administration team in your department) to get their views
5	Informally discuss the case with a safeguarding / student welfare lead at the university
6	Report the case to a safeguarding / student welfare lead at the university
7	Informally discuss the case with a government official, such as a police officer or local authority Prevent officer (e.g. phone call)
8	Report the case to Prevent (i.e. for review at Channel)
9	Call the 'Anti-Terrorism Hotline'
10	Contact the Department for Education's Counter-Extremism helpline

SCALE

1	Very unlikely
2	Unlikely
3	Somewhat unlikely
4	Neither likely nor unlikely

5	Somewhat likely
6	Likely
7	Very likely

Q2. Please indicate on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being 'Not confident at all' and 7 being 'Very confident' how confident you felt in selecting what action you would take in Adam's case.

Please select one answer only

1	Not confident at all
2	Unconfident
3	Somewhat unconfident
4	Neither confident nor unconfident
5	Somewhat confident
6	Confident
7	Very confident

Q3. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

There are reasonable grounds for suspecting that radicalisation has occurred in the scenario regarding Adam

Please select one answer only

1	Strongly disagree
2	Disagree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Neither agree or disagree

5	Somewhat agree
6	Agree
7	Strongly agree

Q4. Please indicate which of the following influences you think could be involved in Adam's radicalisation. *[ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHO RESPONDED 5-7 for Q3]*

Please select all that apply: *[RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]*

1	Animal Rights
2	Environmentalism
3	Far Left
4	Far Right
5	Incel
6	Islamist
7	Mixed or non-specific ideology
8	Other
9	Don't know

If other, please specify [open text response]

SECTION 3: BELIEFS ABOUT RADICALISATION AT UNIVERSITIES

Q5. On a scale of 1 to 10, please indicate the extent to which you consider the following to present potential radicalising influences on Higher Education students in the UK (where 1= no influence and 10 = a very important influence) *[RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]*

1	Animal Rights
2	Environmentalism
3	Far Left

4	Far Right
5	Incel
6	Islamist
7	Mixed or non-specific ideology

Q6. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Please select one answer for each statement *[RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]*

1	It is likely that a student at my university could be radicalised
2	University students in the UK are at risk of radicalisation
3	Students are more likely to be exposed to radicalising content when studying remotely
4	Students are more likely to have been radicalised during the COVID-19 pandemic
5	Changes to teaching due to COVID-19 restrictions mean I would be less likely to be aware of a student becoming radicalised
6	Student societies should be allowed to host any speaker who is not breaking the law

SCALE

1	Strongly disagree
2	Disagree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Neither agree or disagree
5	Somewhat agree
6	Agree
7	Strongly agree

Q7. People should be allowed to express their opinions in public, even those that may

…offend or hurt other people
...threaten the cohesiveness of British society
…Threaten national security

SCALE

1	Strongly disagree
2	Disagree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Neither agree or disagree
5	Somewhat agree
6	Agree
7	Strongly agree

SECTION 3: PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT WITH VULNERABLE STUDENTS

Q8. Have you ever had contact with a student where you have been worried that they could be vulnerable to radicalisation?

Please select one answer only

1	Yes – one student
2	Yes – more than one student
3	No
4	Unsure

Q9 AND Q10 ONLY FOR PEOPLE WHO ANSWERED 'YES' TO Q8.

Q9. In that case [IF Q8 RESPONSE=1] / the most recent case [IF Q8 RESPONSE=2] did you discuss the issue with colleagues regarding your concerns about the student?

Please select one answer only

1	Yes
2	No

Q10. Did you or your university make an external referral to Prevent (e.g. local authority, police) regarding your concerns about the student?

Please select one answer only

1	Yes
2	No
3	Unsure

SECTION 4: BARRIERS AND DRIVERS TO REPORTING

Q11. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

Please select one answer for each statement [RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]

1	It is important for academics to be involved in reporting vulnerability to radicalisation to prevent negative consequences for students
2	Reporting vulnerability to radicalisation is necessary for the safety of young people
3	Radicalisation reporting guidelines are necessary for academics
4	I plan to report vulnerability to radicalisation when I suspect it
5	I lack confidence in the local authority to respond effectively to reports of radicalisation
6	I lack confidence in the police to respond effectively to reports of radicalisation
7	It is a waste of time to report concerns about student radicalisation as nobody will follow up on the report
8	I believe that the current system for reporting vulnerability to radicalisation is effective in addressing the problem
9	I would be uncertain how to properly reports concerns around student vulnerability to radicalisation
10	I would be reluctant to report a case because it could damage my relationship with the student

11	I would be apprehensive to report vulnerability to radicalisation for fear of family / community retaliation
12	Academics who fail to report even minor concerns about student vulnerability to radicalisation can get into trouble
13	I would find it difficult to report vulnerabilities to radicalisation as it is hard to recognise the appropriate threshold
14	I would be concerned by reporting I may get an innocent student into trouble
15	I would be concerned about the safety and security of others if I did not report (i.e. the individual eventually went onto commit an act of terrorism).

SCALE

1	Strongly disagree
2	Disagree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Neither agree or disagree
5	Somewhat agree
6	Agree
7	Strongly agree

SECTION 5: PREVENTION EXPOSURE

Q12a Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:
[RESPONSE ORDER RANDOMISED]

1	I am aware of my university's approach to the Prevent Duty
2	I have read guidance provided by my university on the Prevent Duty
3	I know what my role is in relation to the Prevent Duty

SCALE

1	Strongly disagree
2	Disagree
3	Somewhat disagree
4	Neither agree or disagree
5	Somewhat agree
6	Agree
7	Strongly agree

Q12b Please select one answer for each statement:

4	I have participated in online training on the Prevent Duty
5	I have participated in face-to-face training on the Prevent Duty

1	Yes
2	No
3	Unsure

[Q13 WAS ONLY BE SHOWN TO PEOPLE WHO ANSWER YES TO Q12b4 OR Q12b5]

SCREEN 5.2

Q13. If you have undertaken any Prevent training, please indicate how useful it has been in helping you to understand how to recognise student vulnerabilities to radicalisation and to understand the threshold for reporting concerns.

SCALE

1	Not at all useful
2	Not very useful
3	Unsure

4	Useful
5	Very useful

SECTION 6: DEMOGRAPHICS

Q14. Please tell us your gender.

Please select one answer only

1	Male
2	Female
3	Non-binary
4	Prefer not to say

Q15. How many years have you taught in Higher Education?

Please select one answer only

1	Less than 1 year
2	1-2 years
3	3-5 years
4	6-10 years
5	11-20 years
6	Over 20 years

Q16. Which of the following best describes your role?

Please select one answer only

1	Lecturer or equivalent
2	Senior Lecturer or equivalent
3	Reader
3	Professor
4	Other

SECTION 7: MANIUPLATION CHECK

Q19. Thinking back to the case of Adam, how worried does that case make you in terms of Adam potentially being radicalised? *Please select one answer only*

1	Not worried at all
2	Slightly worried
3	Very worried
4	Uncertain

SECTION 8: FEEDBACK

Thank you very much for completing this survey. Please click on the button below to submit your answers and exit the survey.

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